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Go Forth and Do Good:

US-Iranian Relations During the Cold War
Through the lens of Public Diplomacy

Sara Ehsani-Nia

“The government of Iran has invited us and provided necessary conditions for our
work. We must do our best in helping the growing generation in Iran to comprehend
the wholesome ideas of freedom and democracy and the dignity of the individual,
thereby preventing them from going to the mullahs to learn Islam which bars the
country from modern life.”1
After World War II, the United States began providing extensive
foreign aid to many nations throughout the world. As the US grew as
a world power, it abandoned the isolationist practices that had been in
place during the interwar period. The US directed assistance to those
in need of financial and technical aid—nations ravaged by World War
II, as well as less-developed nations striving for social and economic
advancement. In order to maintain “world order,” secure necessary
resources, covertly fight the Cold War, and push the developing Third
World continuously forward, the US was more determined than ever
to have a worldwide presence. It was the “innate American ability to
get things done” that would make it happen.2
Iran featured prominently in the American government’s postwar
plans. Due to the Soviet Union’s close proximity, the United States
sought to keep a stronghold on capitalism in the region and build a
strong ally of Iran. After all, Iran was one of two American allied
countries bordering the Soviet Union.3 Iran was also of interest to
the United States because of its natural resources; for much of the
twentieth century, Iran held the largest oil refinery in the world.4
For these reasons, the United States became heavily invested in Iran
militarily, politically, and economically. Through broadly defined terms
of economic assistance, military assistance, sales and grants of surplus
agricultural commodities, and miscellaneous expenditures, the U.S.
invested over $1.6 billion in Iran from 1950 to 1965. Approximately
$118 million of that investment was allocated to social aid measures,
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which were “designed to promote the freedom, independence and
growth of Iran.”5
This article will consider American aid given to Iran, as well as the
reasons and ways in which Iran welcomed this aid. It will address the
accomplishments and shortcomings of the programs, the role aid
played in the greater scheme of international politics within the realm
of the Cold War, and what lasting impression these public diplomacy
programs had on Iran. This article will focus on three particular
public diplomacy programs: Point Four, the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID), and the Peace Corps.
With President Harry Truman’s 1949 inaugural address promising
to extend technical aid to developing countries, Iran became the first
country to reap the benefits of the public diplomacy program known
as Point Four. “If through Point Four we can give people a sense of
confidence in their own power to build better lives for themselves,”
one Point Four official asserted, “they won’t pay much attention to
the communist agitators.”6 This initial agreement laid the groundwork
for future social aid programs to Iran, as well as extensive military
assistance and economic loans. USAID, a subset of Point Four and
the International Cooperation Administration of the 1950s, was
enacted in 1961 under President John F. Kennedy’s executive order.
USAID expanded the American presence in Iran and, according to
USAID officials, made substantial progress in Iran until 1966 when
economic aid programs to Iran were concluded. The Peace Corps, also
established in 1961, was a new kind of public diplomacy initiative that
placed young Americans, frequently college graduates, on the ground
where they contributed to social development projects. Between 1961
and 1976, the Peace Corps sent over 2,000 young Americans to Iran,
where they worked at the “grass roots” level. The Peace Corps came
to play a significant role in cultural diplomacy against the backdrop of
the Cold War.
The source base for this study is extensive and draws upon American
government documents from the National Archives in Washington,
D.C.; USAID online archives; Iranian government documents from
the Center for History and Diplomacy in Tehran, Iran; American and
Penn History Review

77

“Go Forth and Do Good”

Iranian newspapers from the time period, as well as interviews with
returned Peace Corps volunteers who served in Iran. Because many
relevant documents at the National Archives remain classified, the
work cited in this article must limit itself to what was available in 2011.
The Close of World War II and the Journey to Intensified USIranian Relations
To understand the intensity of U.S.-Iranian relations during this
period, it is important to note Iran’s past relations with Western
powers as well as ambitions for the future. Iran’s tense relations with
the Soviet Union and Britain since the early 20th century predisposed it
to welcome the United States as a possible neutral third party.
During World War II, American, British, and Soviet forces occupied
Iran to assure stability and success in the war. In 1941, the Allied
Powers forced Iran’s head of state, Reza Pahlavi Shah, to abdicate his
throne in favor of his young son, Mohammad Reza Shah, after Reza
Shah refused to expel German nationals from Iran. Among the three
countries, the British and Soviets had an especially vested interest in
Iran because of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) as well as
the oil concessions arranged with the Soviet Union. British forces,
protecting the interests of APOC, occupied the southern region of
Iran while the Soviets occupied in the north. British powers were
concerned with Iranian domestic issues insofar as oil interests were
affected. For example, in July 1946 when oil workers went on strike to
protest poor working conditions, the British responded by positioning
battleships off the coast of Abadan. The Soviets, on the other hand,
were more intent on absorbing Iran and its resource-rich lands into
Soviet territories, or at least into its sphere of influence. Because such
formidable world powers were pursuing oil supplies and occupying
extensive portions of Iran, in addition to the WWII occupation, Iran
feared manipulation by foreign powers.
Mohammad Reza Shah, second in the Pahlavi Dynasty who ascended
the throne at the age of twenty-one, faced relative political instability in
his reign.7 He felt threatened by the encroachment of British and Soviet
powers in domestic affairs, and feared Iran’s future was in jeopardy if
78
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With American-imported engineers and technicians, bridges
were constructed where there were none; this bridged was
erected with village and tribal labor that would enable easier
transportation. Source: USAID archives, “Highlights of the
Aid Program in Iran,” (http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/
PDACQ758.pdf).
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calculated autonomy was not established. The Shah’s strategy to reach
such autonomy was through an alliance with the United States. The
Shah welcomed the United States with open arms and aggressively
pursued American aid. In fact, virtually no international aid program
in Iran began without an invitation from the Middle Eastern country.
Multiple aid request rejections did not deter Prime Minster Qavam
and the Shah’s determination to improve Iran’s economy and world
status by way of the United States. As a gesture, Iran contracted out to
American Overseas Consults, Inc, a large and prestigious engineering
firm frequently hired by the American government. On February 15,
1949 the Majlis, Iran’s legislative body, enacted into law the resulting
Seven Year Development Plan.8 The Plan detailed a wide variety
of economic and development projects ranging from expanding
production, increasing exports, and developing agriculture to improving
public health and education. The Shah and Iranian legislatures hoped
this plan would communicate enthusiasm for modernization. thereby
prompting American aid in return. In any case, the projects and
improvements outlined in the consultants’ reports called for measures
that Iran’s national budget could not afford; actual implementation
required outside funding.
In 1949, a hopeful Shah visited the United States by invitation of
President Truman, but returned home disappointed after the trip
produced no substantial agreement of aid to Iran. In the book he
later wrote in 1962, reflecting on Iran’s American-bolstered postwar progress towards modernity, he commented on his meeting with
Truman and the state of Iran after not receiving aid. “Such a serious
setback to our hopes convinced many of my people that the United
States had deserted them, and anti-American sentiment developed,
with a corresponding strengthening of the National Front party9.”10
There was validity to the Shah’s statements: Iran’s political and
economic instability during this period was evident. After an upsurge
of Iran’s communist Tudeh Party in the Azerbaijan region, northwest
Iran, Qavam sought to ease Tudeh and Soviet pressures with American
aid. Iran was also overwhelmed with political chaos in the years before
aid; on February 4, 1949, the Shah survived an assassination attempt
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at Tehran University, and on November 4 of that year Prime Minister
Abdul Hussein Hazhir was assassinated. With the state of the nation’s
economy, shaky political position, and proximity to the Soviet Union,
Iranian leaders believed that Britain or the Soviet Union would seize
power in Iran. Qavam and the Shah sought to alleviate Iran’s political
and economic struggles with American aid, wholly believing that US
aid would not only usher in a strong western alliance and subdue the
Soviet Union, but would also result in a more pronounced and higher
global standing through American-promoted national security.
The greatest challenge Iran faced after WWII was national security.
The evacuation of Soviet troops and the collapse of the Azeri and
Kurdish rebel regimes did not resolve the problem of national
autonomy. After the highly publicized evacuation of Soviet troops
from Iran, Soviet-supported Azeri and Kurdish rebel regimes surged
in the North. Prime Minister Qavam and the Shah, backed by the
U.S., intended to free Azerbaijan of the rebel occupation, but before
an attack could be made both separatist regimes crumbled due to
internal contention as well as the military threat posed by Tehran.
Incessant Soviet pressures simply reinforced the thinking that Iran
must be preserved by every possible means, and that American aid was
imperative. Although Iran was an unindustrialized, under-developed
nation with many social handicaps, to some leaders, such as the Shah,
socioeconomic betterment of the country was subordinate to the
necessity of a stable and autonomous state that could defend itself.
“The most basic of human needs is a peaceful, secure environment so
that men can develop themselves and their country,” the Shah asserted
in his 1962 book. “In a sense this need is even more fundamental
than that for food and shelter, for security constitutes the essential
prerequisite for producing enough food and shelter.”11
Needless to say, not all felt this way. “Why should a poor nation such
as ours that has gone through years of poverty be armed to defend the
selfish interests of the millionaires of America and England? This is
the story of the wolf and the lamb. Why doesn’t the United States give
us aid to help us improve our education, agriculture, and health?” one
journalist wrote in Iran’s Kayhan Times. “This is a $10 million baited trap
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that we must jump away from.”12 Given Iran’s monarchy and high rates
of illiteracy, the population was not represented in government and
the actions of policy-makers and leaders were by no means indicative
of national sentiment. Affluent leaders of Iran sought immediate aid
from the U.S., not to raise the standard of living, but to establish a
modern industrialized country with a military that could avert the
threat of foreigners. Despite the criticisms of some, many Iranian
leaders believed that, given the circumstances and what was at stake in
their relationship with the United States, the benefits of economic and
military aid outweighed any foreseeable costs.
Although many political analysts in Washington were convinced
that Iran’s security was an important US interest because of Iran’s oil
resources and strategic location, few wanted to prioritize Iran over
Western Europe in the postwar years. Iran had to wait until the early
1950s, when the Marshall Plan was discontinued and aid to Western
Europe was dramatically reduced after American policy makers
assessed Europe no longer needed aid. With the intensification of
the Cold War and introduction of containment measures, American
concepts of security were broadened and policy makers looked to the
Middle East for a powerful ally in the region, such as Iran. “The issues
at stake in Iran go far beyond the question of oil. We can be sure that
the Kremlin is losing no opportunity to fish in the troubled water of
Iran, for Iran would be a great and strategic prize quite apart from oil,”
George McGhee, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian
and African Affairs, stated. “Control of Iran, an area approximately as
large as the United States east of the Mississippi River, would put the
Soviet Union astride the communication routes connecting the free
nations of Asia and Europe.”13
Point Four, USAID, and Cold War Politics
After the US cleared a $25 million line of credit to Iran on September
23, 1950, American Ambassador Henry F. Grady communicated to
Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Maraghei that Point Four was to
be on the table soon enough, and not a moment too soon for Iranians.
On October 19 of that year, with the signing of a “Memorandum
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of Understanding,” Iran became the first country to take advantage
of the newly enacted Point Four Technical Assistance Administration
within the State Department.
How did public diplomacy programs exist institutionally both in Iran
and the US and what did they intend to do? Were the organizations
dedicated to the humanitarian cause for the sake of the cause, or more
to portray an image of a strong Western-oriented relationship? The
purpose of such cultural diplomacy in Iran was to foster a positive
image of the United States despite international policy geared toward
economics and politics, and to transform Iran into the modern state
that would prove a valuable ally in the region. But was such aid a form
of cultural hegemony? What impact did multi-million dollar projects
and thousands of Americans sprawled across Iran for the humanitarian
cause actually make?
Initially named the Technical Cooperation Administration for Iran
and renamed the United States Operation Mission to Iran (or simply
the “Mission”), the program in Iran existed under the International
Cooperation Administration (ICA). In order to collaborate goals and
projects as well as determine the financing of social aid programs, the
two countries established the Iranian-United States Joint Commission
on Rural Improvement. “Economic aid to Iran has been a mutual
assistance undertaking. For the most part the U.S. has provided
necessary foreign exchange and technical skills,” one aid official
wrote in 1954. “The government of Iran has provided local currency,
contributions in kind and a cadre of dynamic men and women
interested in matching Iran’s ancient and illustrious past with a modern
and progressive future.”14
At the outset, Iran received no more than $500,000 in Point Four funds
for the first fiscal year. Historians dispute the reasons that prompted
Washington to extend this Point Four initiative. At the time the United
States began aiding Iran through Point Four, the economic gains were
not sufficient to justify the cost of the program to the American
taxpayer. Iran’s trade with the United States at the time constituted
a very insignificant part of the total American foreign commerce.
As for oil, the American government seemed more concerned with
Penn History Review
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keeping the Iranian petroleum resources out of Soviet hands than with
developing technology and extracting oil.
Officially, American objectives in Iran focused on raising the standard
of living and helping Iranians help themselves.15 Point Four sought
to decrease high illiteracy levels, erase the prevalence of preventable
diseases and raise the standard of health, as well as increase high
quality industrial and agricultural production. Economic development
was considered desirable for its expected political stability, rise in the
national level of living, and resistance to the danger of communism.
The Point Four strategy was that the improvement of living conditions
in Iran would thwart communism at the grass roots level.
After close examination, it is clear that the initiation of Point Four
funds to Iran directly correlated with the growth of the communist
Tudeh Party, strongest in north Iran near influential neighboring
communist states, the Soviet Union and Azerbaijan. So strong in fact that
from 1941-1953 Iran had the largest and most disciplined communist
party in the Middle East.16 The US saw communism as such a growing
threat that beginning in the late 1940s the CIA annually directed $1
million to produce a propaganda machine in Iran. All forms of media
were manipulated in which the CIA “portrayed the Soviet Union and
the Tudeh as anti-Iranian or anti-Islamic, described the harsh reality
of life in the Soviet Union, or explained the Tudeh’s close relationship
with the Soviets and its popular-front strategy.”17 CIA agents were also
said to have broken up Tudeh Party rallies and even instigated violent
acts, which the communist party would be blamed for.18
At a time when the Tudeh Party was soaring, Prime Minister
Mohammad Mossadegh was elected in 1951 on a liberal platform calling
for the nationalization of the oil industry.19 This nationalistic initiative,
however, did not bode well with Western interests. This was a time
when many American analysts were unable to distinguish nationalism
from communism. Because the security of British oil equity in Iran
was in the best interest of the Western world, it was an opportunity for
Washington to showcase its super-power capabilities. The perceived
threat of a communist take over coupled with the outrage of the
APOC, who stood to lose the most, was the motivation behind the
84

Sara Ehsani-Nia

“Go Forth and Do Good”

CIA’s first coup d’état of a foreign democratically elected leader, at
the cool price of $19 million.20 The United States did not consider
just how much this action would affect Iran’s national psychology and
democratic process. After the coup, the Majlis never operated in the
same way again—in fact, there were periods when the congressional
body didn’t operate at all; such as from 1961-1963, when the autocratic
Shah shut down Majlis entirely. Given the pressures within Iranian
politics, the 1950 Point Four allotment of $500,000 was increased to
$23.4 million by 1952.21 That Iran received the largest share of Point
Four funds between 1950 and 1953, when the Tudeh Party was so
strong and the liberal Prime Minister Mossadegh was in power, was no
coincidence.22
When the Mission entered Iran, it had a variety of systematic issues
to address, and many obstacles to overcome. One report detailed the
state of disrepair in Iran:
“With approximately 17 million inhabitants, a birth rate
estimated at less than 2 percent per year, and a per capita income
estimated at less than $100 per year, the population was about
85 percent rural and grossly handicapped by a maze of highly
interrelated problems. The vast majority of the population
lived in an environment of illiteracy with an inadequate and, in
many cases, nonexistent system of schools, an underdeveloped
system of roads and other means of communication, poor
sanitation and health, low level of production methods and
practices of farming and forestry, inadequate and unsafe
drinking water, inadequate water for irrigation and general
insecurity.”23
In order to address all these issues, American aid officials frequently
referred to the expertise of professionals in American universities,
technical firms and commercial contractors to complete projects in
Iran.24
The projects surrounding public health focused on both immediate
improvement of health and sanitation in Iran as well as increased
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Mobile tent schools were established in several of Iran’s largest
tribes, bringing literacy to the nomadic peoples of Iran. Source:
USAID archives, “Highlights of the Aid Program in Iran,”
(http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACQ758.pdf).
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accessibility. Public health sector activities included the establishment
of public health facilities, health centers and laboratories, mobile health
unites, environmental sanitation, health education, and advancement
of medical and nursing schools.25 Disease control became public
health’s largest and most impressive accomplishment. Prior to Point
Four in Iran, health standards were dire; according to the Mission, Iran
had an infant mortality rate of 50%, life expectancy of 30 years, and a
variety of preventable diseases reeking havoc.26
When American health workers entered Iran in 1951, officials
reported that those living in rural villages did not know bacteria or
mosquitoes spread malaria. Prior to 1950, 80% of Iran’s population
lived in malaria-infested areas, with rates of infection reaching 90%
in some villages during the summer months.27 With the efforts of
the U.S. Public Health team, paired with the Iranian Department of
Public Health and the World Health Organization, trained malaria
spray teams went to rural areas. According to the Mission’s reports,
in just four years the incidence of malaria decreased from 90% to
less than 1%. An additional result of this measure was the expansion
of cultivable land. National campaigns against major diseases, such
as malaria and smallpox, as well as the importance of clean water
had led to significant reduction in the death rate and a substantial
increase in effective manpower; surveys suggested that this reduction
in disease increased the effective manpower rate by as much as 400%.28
Before the Mission’s DDT malaria spraying, three-quarters of infants
contracted malaria within their first year of life; that staggering statistic
was reduced to zero in just a few months.29
According to the Mission, the public health efforts made some
lasting contributions to healthier living practices in rural areas. After
initial DDT sprayings by American professionals, locals in rural areas
were quick to learn and were able to complete the task themselves.
Iranian men and women coping with malaria since childhood could
not imagine life without it. One farmer pulled aside a Mission worker
after the results were clear, and told him: “We were dead, and now we
are alive.”30 People were suffering and dying from preventable diseases,
such as malaria, for lack of medicine and lack of physicians. Malaria
Penn History Review
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had been an immense problem in Iran, and the eradication of that
issue was America’s greatest contribution to Iran’s “greater good” as
the Mission worked with Iran’s Ministry of Health to achieve shortterm as well as long-term goals of a more health-educated and healthconscious society.
Other public health initiatives included mobile health units, which
occasionally journeyed through provinces and rural areas of Iran, and
educational health-oriented films. American technicians from Syracuse
University worked a training program in Iran to produce 80 educational
films from 1952-1957.31 The team used local people as actors to make
health educational films on proper sanitation in the home and with
livestock, on the training of midwives, on bacteria, on malaria, and
other prevalent preventative diseases in Iran.
In the field of education, the Mission sought to establish additional
school facilities, more and better trained teachers, improved reading
material, and a modern curriculum. The Mission repaired existing
schools and built schools where there were none. It stocked educational
supplies such as books, pamphlets, maps, and charts in every
classroom. When US aid forces entered the country, Iran’s greatest
social problem was cripplingly high illiteracy, plaguing approximately
85% of the population, therefore it was the program’s main focus.32
One source claims illiteracy was as high as 90% in 1949.33 Point Four’s
most extensive educational program was in Iran.34
American aid workers organized intensive teacher trainings. Between
1950 and 1956 the number of public schools in Iran doubled and the
number of teachers in elementary and high school increased from
17,000 to 36,000.35 From 1952 to 1961 nearly 33,000 teachers were
introduced to the Mission’s summer school teacher training plan. In
1956 the Ministry of Education took responsibility for the teachertraining program, but American professionals continued serving
as advisors.36 Iran’s school curriculum was also subject to change.
The Mission and the Ministry of Education fundamentally altered
the curriculum to reflect the priorities of a modern day education,
modeled after the American public school system.37 The curriculum’s
focus shifted to include vocational training, an emphasis on science, as
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well as physical and health education.
In 1950 Iran had approximately two million nomadic peoples,
composed of six major tribes.38 Both the Mission and the Iranian
government wanted to bring education and literacy to these tribes
without altering their way of life. In 1953 the Mission worked
resourcefully with the Ministry of Education to assist in educating
tribal children through the implementation of tent schools that moved
with the tribes and their flocks. After much discussion, tribal leaders
agreed to select several hundred bright young men from within their
tribes, all whom had reached at least sixth grade, to undergo training
and return as teachers. In the summer of 1953, while the young men
were taking part in an intensive six-week teacher training program,
the Mission distributed all of the necessary supplies to tribes: tents,
portable lap desks, text books, blackboards, pencils, crayons, as well as
volleyball nets and other playground equipment. The teacher training
was focused on reading, writing, arithmetic, and physical education.
Literacy was the main objective.
The idea was to educate and train members of various tribal
communities, for as long as time would allow, and return them to their
tribes where they could educate the children. Although some tribesmen
were hesitant about the educational program’s entrance into their
community, seven months into the program Mission officials reported
great enthusiasm for the project throughout the communities as well
as great pupil progress. Tribesmen expressed so much interest that one
chief insisted the school be held seven days a week for eight hours
a day, instead of following the normal school schedule. The Mission
saw remarkable results; in less than a year, reports claimed over 12,000
students enrolled in 375 such schools and over 1,000 children were
able to read and write as a result of the Mission’s tribal schools.39
With this initial success, the Mission expanded the tribal educational
foundation to include practical work in livestock and agriculture as well
as health education. This was significant considering some tribal areas
had recently lost 60% of their livestock to disease in a single season.40
By training teachers to educate tribal communities in proper sanitation
practices, disease control measures, and safe methods of first aid and
Penn History Review
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emergency treatment, common systematic diseases in participating
tribes became preventable. According to Point Four reports, tribes not
only met these educational initiatives with great enthusiasm, but also
received requests from chiefs for an increase in school facilities for the
children.
Beside the Mission’s educational pursuits, another promising
academic opportunity presented itself at the Shah’s request. In
summer of 1958, during his visit to Washington, the Shah expressed
great interest in creating an American-style university in Iran while
meeting with President Dwight D. Eisenhower. In a letter from
Iranian Ambassador Dr Ali Gholi Ardalan to Vice President Nixon,
the ambassador reiterated the Shah’s sentiments. “An American-style
University situated in southern Iran would afford so many advantages
and be of such great benefit to both our countries…to be successful,
however, an American-type university must not only be guided by,
but also directed by, American educators.”41 It was at this request that
the State Department organized an exploratory expedition through
Iran, and chose President Gaylord Harnwell of the University of
Pennsylvania to lead the tour. After reporting on the feasibility of
establishing an American-style university in Iran, Harnwell and the
University of Pennsylvania played a significant role in launching
Pahlavi University in the southern city of Shiraz.42 This series of
events resulted in the subsequent friendship of Harnwell and the
Shah, culminating in the Shah’s trip to the universoty in 1962 in which
he was granted an honorary law degree.
Beyond its benign manifestations of aid, such as education,
agriculture and health, the Mission also became involved in more
controversial areas. A division of Point Four in Iran was police and
military training, ensuring that “officers have received special riot
training to enable them to control rebellion.”43 But how did military
and police training fit under Point Four’s supposed mission of technical
assistance to underdeveloped countries? The aid program claimed to
champion the elimination of handicaps in underdeveloped areas of
the world: eradicating preventable diseases, as well as bringing literacy
and sustainable agricultural practices to rural areas. How was the US
90
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After Point Four entered Iran, vaccinations became free and
accessible to millions of Iranians every year. Source: USAID
archives, “Highlights of the Aid Program in Iran,” (http://pdf.
usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACQ758.pdf).
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justifying the bolstering of the Iranian police force as a tenet of Point
Four? Despite this, the Mission received adequate endorsement of the
controversial plan by Point Four officials and members of Congress,
evident in their approval of American “social aid” applied to a national
police force that was already notorious for oppressing the Iranian
people. Militant and police strengthening under Point Four was a
misappropriation of taxpayer dollars, and an area in which Point Four
exclusively pushed its agenda in favor of American interests. In any
case, the United States had controversies of its own in the realm of
law enforcement during this period. After all, it was American police
that unleashed fire hoses and dogs on peaceful protestors and children
in Birmingham and college campuses across the nation in the 50s and
60s.
Once the US extended Point Four funds and other forms of aid to
Iran, relations between the two countries deepened. In 1955 Iran entered
the Baghdad Pact, later renamed the Central Treaty Organization
(CENTO), which was established by the United States and Britain to
keep Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and Iraq safely in the Western sphere as a
bulwark against communism. This move marked a period of increased
tension between Iran and the Soviet Union. For the next seven years
the Soviet Union launched vicious propaganda campaigns against
the Shah and the Iranian government. Tensions eased in September
1962, when the Shah declared that foreign nuclear weapons were not
to be stationed in Iran.44 Afterwards, Iran began a technical assistance
program, and a trading agreement with the Soviet Union, keeping with
its habit of requesting and receiving aid wherever it could.45
In 1961, the United States Agency for International Aid was
established under the Kennedy administration. For Iran, USAID’s
entrance simply continued the work of Point Four. Although Iran
was still receiving a substantial aid funding, the figures had steadily
and subtly decreased since its heyday in the mid-1950s. For the years
from 1946 to 1965, the American foreign assistance program reached
a cumulative figure of over $117 billion in aid to over 100 nations.46
Included in this global figure was almost $1.6 billion provided to the
Government of Iran to finance mutually agreed upon economic and
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military activities designed to promote the freedom, independence and
growth of Iran. By 1965, Point Four and USAID funds totaled in
$118.4 million in US technical assistance to Iran.47 Areas of technical
assistance included agriculture, community development, education,
health, industrial development, labor, public administration and public
safety. Beyond technical and social aid, Iran was receiving additional
assistance from the United States. “Between 1953-57, the United States
provided grants in excess of $250 million, and loans totaling over $116
million to assist the government of Iran survive a period of extreme
economic instability,” stated one government report.48
From 1951 to 1965 several million Iranians were trained in the
educational sector alone. By 1963, Iranian elementary schools had
increased by 80%, teachers by 90% and enrollment by 120%.49 Perhaps
this contributed to the Shah’s 1962 decision to replace French with
English as Iran’s official second language. Technicians trained teachers
in more effective ways of educating, and altered the curriculum to
better suit the job market. The number could, however, be even higher
given that the teachers trained could have taught others as well. “Selfreliance” projects, focused on helping Iranians to help themselves in
various sectors, were spread to every Iranian village; by 1965, over
70,000 projects were supposedly completed.50 Through conclusive
reports, USAID reassured Congress and the American people that the
billions of aid dollars were used successfully, significantly improving
the lives of Iranians.
The Peace Corps: Devising American Aid at the Grass Roots
“In the war of ideas, a war for the minds and hearts of the people, the victor
will be those who have thoroughly studied the natives, in particular their psychology
which is deeply influenced by an inferiority complex, widespread among the people
of Iran.”51
“How many of you are willing to spend ten years in Africa or
Latin America or Asia working for the United States and working for
freedom? How many of you who are going to be doctors are willing
to spend your days in Ghana? Technicians or engineers, how many of
you are willing to work in the Foreign Service and spend your lives
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traveling around the world? On your willingness to do that, not merely
to serve one year or two years in the service, but on your willingness
to contribute part of your life to this country, I think will depend the
answer whether a free society can compete.”52 These were the words
of John F. Kennedy in 1960, challenging the students of the University
of Michigan to do great things, and what many believe was Kennedy’s
first proposal of the Peace Corps. By the end of the 1960s, over
22,000 volunteers traveled the world, representing the United States
in underdeveloped countries, and achieving the goals of the Peace
Corps.53
The Peace Corps was an agenda-driven grassroots form of foreign
policy, which recruited young, frequently college-educated, wellintentioned American volunteers who sought to make a positive
difference in the world. After language and skill training in the United
States, volunteers served two years in an underdeveloped country
working in agriculture, industry, education, and health. 54 Peace Corps
leaders envisioned this form of public diplomacy not to be categorically
economic, but rather a cultural exchange initiative from which the host
country benefited.
The Peace Corps was both an activity for students seeking public
service, as well as beneficial to host communities. While Kennedy,
a president focused on foreign policy, envisioned the Peace Corps
fulfilling a multifaceted purpose, he had one primary intention.
“Through the Peace Corps, Kennedy attempted to project a nonopportunistic image and reinforce the perception of other nations that
the primary objective of the United States towards the third world was
not ‘to dominate’ but ‘to help.’”55 The Peace Corps was to fight the
Cold War by using “culture-to-culture diplomacy to make friends in
nations that had little inherent power but that could without warning
become theaters of the cold war.”56 It was a seemingly ingenious way
to entice people at the grassroots level that the American way of life
was the best way, and show them the generosity of the United States.
Naturally, Iran requested Peace Corps services and the first group
entered in 1962. From 1962-1976, more than 2,000 volunteers went to
Iran to foster a positive image of the United States.57
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Experiences on the Ground
There were volunteers in Iran who gained thoroughly positive
experiences, as well as those more troubled by the politics at play.
“Any country that has more than three varieties of jam,” volunteer
Michael Dereskewicz remembered thinking, “doesn’t need Peace
Corps volunteers.”58 Jest aside, he was a true believer in the Peace
Corps and international aid, and valued the personal relationships he
cultivated with Iranians. Having had a positive experience, Dereskewicz
considered his service a contribution to Iran’s greater good. In an
interview, volunteer Jennifer Seaver echoed Dereskewicz’s nostalgia
and assenting attitude, but added the obstacles she faced as a female
volunteer in a country with more gender inequality the US.59 Volunteer
Doug Schermer observed the tense power dynamic in Iran but that
it did not play a large role in his service. “Of course I was able to
perceive that I was in a dictatorship and could feel the presence of
SAVAK [Iran’s secret police, established by the CIA]. I was aware of
the 1953 coup and suspected the worst when it came to the relations
between the CIA and SAVAK. But these things were not part of my
daily experience.”
Some volunteers stationed in Iran, however, were a more cognizant
of the realities and paradoxes in US-Iranian relations, and sensed they
were at the rungs of the Cold War. “We were an exchange for tanks, we
understood,” volunteer Ricks recalled.60 Through his experiences, Ricks
sensed the hypocrisies in relations, such as the Shah’s prioritization of
the military over social reform, which traced back to the negotiations
for aid in the late 1940s. On the state of Iran, Ricks remarked that “there
was the Iran that benefited from the U.S.-Iranian puppet relationship,
the technocrats, and there was the rural poor, the forgotten Iranians.”61
Some Peace Corps volunteers were aware of the American-backed
systematic disenfranchisement of Iranians.
Besides the unnecessary and preventable struggles Peace Corps
volunteers faced in Iran, such as poor language and misleading area
studies training, volunteers had to win over locals with varying degrees
of prejudgments. Some Iranians were hesitant about the Peace
Corps—alongside all aid programs to Iran—as it was a challenge to
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Peace Corps members in Iran, circa 1974. Source: “Peace Corps
Still Pictures,” at the National Archives in Washington, D.C.
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their national sense of self-worth, coupled with their general mistrust
of the US and the surface-level aid programs. Additionally, with the
progressive efforts of the Western-enthusiastic Shah, Iran in the 1960s
was not as in-need of such a program as other poverty-stricken nations
in the world, and this played a role in Iranian hostility towards US aid.
At a time when volunteers were being sent to more destitute areas of
the globe, many thought of the volunteers in Iran as unnecessary as
Iran’s largest problem was illiteracy, not famine.
Robert Burkhardt, an Iran 2 Project volunteer, recalled the comment
of the school principal where he was stationed to teach. “‘I welcome
you to my country. I’m glad that you come to work with us and help
us. But we don’t need you Americans. We tolerate you. You think you’re
so goddamned superior but our culture is four thousand years old and
yours is two hundred years old.”62
“We got the impression we were golden boys and girls, clean-cut
American youth, off to the Near East to wreak great changes among
the backward Iranians,” a Group 1 volunteer said. “When we got here,
we found out we were assistants—and in most cases, to Iranians who
were as good or better than most of us.”63
The discomfort some felt towards the presence of Peace Corps
volunteers was amplified by doubts of the organization’s true intentions.
Many Iranians were skeptical of the presence of American do-gooders,
truly believing the Peace Corps was a conduit for CIA recruits. There
was a general suspicion that the Peace Corps was covertly infiltrated
with CIA spies; that the Corps was merely a platform for spying on
Third World countries. At times, Peace Corps volunteers in Iran ran
into trouble with local authorities; some were even detained, but usually
for no longer than several days. After all, Iranians had good reason to
mistrust the US.
However, it was not just Iranian citizens that were suspicious of
Peace Corps activity; the Iranian government, which had invited the
Corps, was too. Volunteer Burkhart recalled being steadily watched
by Iran’s secret police. “In every class I gave there would be an agent
from the SAVAK sitting among the students.”64 This illustrates the
Shah’s deep-rooted mistrust towards the US, as well as the scope
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of subversion. Would the spread of idealistic Americans across the
Iranian countryside lead to modernity or dissidence?
The Soviet Union certainly suspected foul play in the Peace Corps.
There were a number of cases in which workers from Soviet embassies
approached and bribed Peace Corps volunteers for information or
documents. “In two cases overseas the Peace Corps discovered that
the Russian embassy had rented space in offices immediately above
or connected to Peace Corps offices with the obvious intention of
eavesdropping.”65 In 1966, volunteer Thomas R. Dawson, stationed
in Iran, was arrested and detained by Soviet forces. He had been
traveling to his workshop site in Northern Iran and changed buses
in the village of Astara, where the shallow Aral River was the only
marker of the Iranian-Soviet border.66 Supposedly unbeknownst to
Dawson, he waded into the river and upon reaching the other side he
was apprehended by Soviet soldiers. After being transported to Baku,
in Soviet Azerbaijan, he was held for three weeks before his release
negotiations were successful.67 The moment of his arrest, however,
Iran had declared him persona non grata.68 Was he secretly a CIA
agent or another American oblivious to the world map?
This stigma against the Peace Corps was a challenge that Director
Shriver worked very hard to overcome. With strenuous and
comprehensive background checks, the Peace Corps weeded out
volunteers who had any history or past relation with the CIA. Returning
volunteers were also prohibited from working for the CIA for a fiveyear “cooling off period.”69 Perhaps this was overcompensation on
Shriver’s part; according to Peace Corps investigations, no volunteer
had ever been exposed as an undercover CIA affiliate.70
US Aid and the Consolidation of the Pahlavi Monarchy
In 1966, the US Overseas Mission to Iran and Congress believed
that obstacles had been overcome, goals had been reached, and
progress had been made in Iran. USAID assumed that with apparent
political and economic stability, Iran would be able to move forward
successfully without continued American technical and social aid. But
American aid officials also determined that with Iranian oil revenues
reaching new heights, Iran had become economically capable of
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undertaking all of the financial responsibilities to continue the projects
and progress made during the American aid tenure. In 1967 the US
declared Iran a developed country.71 This marked a turning point in
U.S.-Iranian relations; while direct aid was discontinued, American
military assistance to Iran increased along side oil revenues. By the
early 1970s, Iran had the largest military in the Middle East.
The Committee on Foreign Affairs published a neatly put together
pamphlet in 1966 as a conclusive bookend argument on USAID’s
departure of Iran. “Iran survived the troubled period of the early
1950s, grew steadily stronger throughout the late 1950s and early
1960s, and is today enjoying political stability, economic growth, and
social change unique to this part of the world…the USAID Mission
has been deeply involved in the work that has made this progress
possible.”72 By 1966, literacy rates had been improved some from the
20% figure existing when Point Four entered Iran. According to the
national census of 1966, 40.1% of males and 17.9% of females of six
years or more were literate.73
Despite claimed altruistic purposes, however, the missions of Point
Four and USAID held a large paradox. Washington tried to foster social
progress in Third World countries, while simultaneously attempting to
maintain the same status quo that enabled such a government, like the
Shah’s regime, to prosper and continue. The American government
was not prepared to advocate or support many reforms it had
traditionally preached and was ideologically committed to promote.
In an article in Conservation magazine, Stanely Cain commented on
this very phenomenon. “It often seems that while trying to help the
common man through our programs of technical cooperation under
Point Four and the like, we at the same time endeavor to preserve the
status quo. We sometimes find ourselves in the incongruous role of
helping the pot boil while trying to sit on the lid.”74
Time and again, American government officials applauded the Shah
for sharing the values of freedom, democracy, and liberty in detailed
government documents. But in truth, even if Iran was becoming
an increasingly progressive country with aspirations of future social
modernity, it did not have the foundation of a democratic society. It
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had a monarchy, an underrepresented population with a large disparity
between rich and poor, and a puppet congress that depended on the
Shah’s whim. The Shah’s Western-oriented leadership and government
fulfilled American interests both geo-strategically and in oil resources,
which was the ultimate goal of public diplomacy efforts. It seems that
neither the Shah’s brutal treatment of civilians and fear tactics nor his
pocketing of aid dollars deterred the American projected image of a
noble and progressive Mohammad Reza Shah.
Point Four’s indisputable conceptual and functional contradictions
are visible in the construction of most projects. In an attempt to
protect the political and strategic interests of the United States, the
program had to place its chief emphasis on short-run, tactical and
expedient maneuvers the results of which could be immediately
evident. “The objective of the program in the early days,” one Mission
official described in 1957, “was to keep the country on an even keel.
We tried to keep influential people happy, in power, and friendly to us.
We tried to do things that people seemed to like and felt were good
for them.”75
This paradox also influenced the reach of aid. We see that both
American and Iranian interests shaped and hindered the way in
which Point Four came to be in Iran. Aid policy makers had to make
concessions in project conception and direction in order to gain
joint political support from the Iranian Majlis. Had the United States
pressed Iran to make changes that would be unsettling to the Iranian
government’s stability, Point Four would have no longer been welcome
in Iran.
Although Point Four and USAID documents may lead us to believe
otherwise, by the early 1960s, many Iranian and American observers
expressed doubt as to what was becoming of aid dollars in Iran.
Through the 1960s journalist Fred J. Cook wrote of U.S.-Iranian covert
affairs related to aid to Iran, all published in The Nation. “Do you know
what the head of the Iranian army told one of our people?” Senator
Hubert H. Humphrey remarked in 1961. “He said the army is now in
good shape, thanks to U.S. aid—and it was now capable of coping with
the civilian population. That army isn’t planning to fight Russians. It’s
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Point Four and USAID established Iran’s police college, which
began training patrolmen in modern police methods. Officers
were trained to enforce the Shah’s absolute power on every level of society, a particularly controversial segment of US aid efforts in Iran. (USAID archives, “Highlights of the Aid Program
in Iran,” (http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACQ758.pdf).
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planning to fight the Iranian people.”76 The Senator said what many
were thinking: aid to Iran was being misappropriated, misused, and
corrupted. The Senator could have been referring to the way the CIA
had established Iran’s oppressive secret police, the SAVAK, or to the
direct military aid from the US or perhaps he was referring to Point
Four and USAID money being poured into “public safety” measures,
and the ramping up of the military and domestic police force.
In 1957 the Committee on Government Operations of the House
of Representatives attempted to decipher what became of some
$250 million in economic aid given to Iran over the past few years,
only to find that it had virtually vanished into thin air. “Our aid,”
the Committee reported, “had been administered in such a loose,
slipshod and unbusinesslike manner that it is now impossible—with
any accuracy—to tell what became of these funds.”77 The committee
claimed that the poor administrative operation of aid in Iran during
the late 50s raised suspicions about the integrity of the program’s
functionality.
In October 1963, in the first session of the 88th Congress, Senator
Ernest Gruening submitted a report entitled “United States Foreign
Aid in Ten Middle Eastern and African Countries,” for the Committee
on Government Operations. Senator Gruening was very critical
of international aid specific to Iran. Recognizing the number of
miscalculations, money frivolously wasted in between projects, and
lacking enthusiasm from the Iranian counterparts, the Senator believed
aid to Iran needed serious reevaluation.
The year the investigation began, there were more than 5,000
incomplete USAID projects. One reflection of this pattern of
inefficiency is exemplified in the circumstances surrounding a project
signed in 1952, when it was to build and supply equipment for a clothweaving factory. Seven years after it was established, since having
received more than $4 million in grants and loans from the US, not a
single report of economic feasibility had been made, at which point
the factory was producing grossly under capacity and hardly cutting
even. In 1960 the matter was supposedly investigated in a report, but
lacked sources of or thoughtful solutions to the problems. In the case
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of a project signed in April 1952 to improve slaughterhouse facilities,
the slaughterhouse never reached an operating status due to lack
of planning, shifting project direction, and contract disagreements.
Senator Gruening’s study states that in 1964, twelve years after the
agreement had been made, the slaughterhouse had not been opened
yet, and not a single evaluation report had been drafted.
This sort of disorganization and inefficiency was rampant in Point
Four’s Mission to Iran. “One wonders whether progress could not
have been made faster in Iran if the pace of US aid had been slower,
more carefully planned and, especially, with more desire on the part
of Iranians for particular development programs.” Iranian leaders’
reluctance to commit to social progress is evident in the time it took
the for social reforms to be implemented. While Point Four had been
in Iran for thirteen years, advocating modernization, the Shah’s White
Revolution did not commence until the mid-60s.78 Given the Senator’s
outlook on the inefficiency of the aid implementation, he ultimately
recommended that aid should continue and be concentrated on a
smaller number of projects, in support of the Shah’s social reforms.79
In 1962, a scandal emerged linking the embezzlement of USAID
funds with high profile individuals. Allegedly, USAID dollars had
been funneled into the Pahlavi Foundation, the Shah’s personal
family fund, and used as bribe money towards Iranian, British, and
American dignitaries. Khaibar Goodarzian “Khan,” a wealthy Britisheducated Iranian businessman and exiled chief of a nomadic Iranian
tribe, exposed this scheme; he was both a confidant to the Shah and a
former member of British military intelligence. Through an established
network of spies in the Imperial Palace complex, Khan reportedly
broke into the Shah’s office safe on February 16, 1962. There, he found
the set checks from 1962, totaling $29 million, linked to the Shah’s
bank account in Switzerland. The ten checks were to be distributed
on behalf of the Pahlavi Foundation to members of the royal family
as well as foreign personalities such as the American Ambassador to
Iran Julius Holmes, CIA Director Allen Dulles, and financier David
Rockefeller.80 With photostated checks, Khan testified before the
McClellan Committee on Government Operations in 1963.81
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“His [Khan’s] photostated records were checked with Treasury
records on the dates of aid payments to Iran and a comparison
show that in repeated instances, multi-million-dollar checks to Iran
were followed swiftly by multi million-dollar deposits in the account
of the Pahlavi Foundation. Teams from the US General Accounting
Office were sent to Iran to try to find the schools and hospitals for
the buildings of which funds had been specifically allocated [from
June 1952-June 1963]. The buildings simply didn’t exist.”82 It should
come to no surprise that while this investigation was under way, aid
to Iran plummeted, from $53 million in USAID in 1962 to just $2.5
in 1965.83 The investigation continued until it was finally dropped in
1967; with continuous pressure from the State Department, Senator
McClellan finally repudiated the allegations additionally discrediting
and deporting Khan.84
In the summer of 1965, after Cook’s article was published in The
Nation, the Shah traveled to request aid from Canada and France, seeing
that American funding was reduced so dramatically. While Canadian
leaders gave the Shah a cold welcome and rejected his request, General
Charles De Gaulle refused to see him at all. The frustrated Shah
returned to Tehran for a few days before making an impromptu visit
to Moscow and signing a long-term credit agreement of $280 million.
The Shah’s calculated action likely resulted in a sobering moment for
President Lyndon Johnson, who restored US-Iranian relations by
1967, the same year Iran was declared a developed country.85
The scandal only exposed the set of checks from 1962, but by that
time aid efforts had been well underway for over ten years. What was
the extent of Point Four embezzlement? Although the McClellan
investigation was not extensively publicized and charges were
never filed, this influenced USAID’s 1966 exit from Iran more than
government documents suggest.
Iran: Benefactor of Aid
The acceptance of Point Four funds, coupled with other forms of
aid, had mixed reviews with the Iranian public. In Mohammad Reza
Shah’s 1962 book, he credits Point Four with modernizing Iran. “Taken
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as a whole, the work in Iran has provided us with never-failing aid and
inspiration in our successful efforts to build a better nation”, the Shah
explained. “I am happy to recognize that Point Four has helped us
towards the achievements in agriculture, public health, and industry.”86
In his book, the Shah communicated his enthusiasm for becoming an
allied world power with the United States, linking East and West.
Besides the Shah’s glowing assessment of Point Four and USAID,
many articles printed in the 1960s proclaimed that Americans did not
understand the first thing about Iran. “Why has the Irano-American
cooperation failed to bring forth expected results? In our opinion, the
main reason is the Americans’ insufficient and occasionally erroneous
knowledge about the Iranians’ unique and complicated mentality,” ”
printed one magazine in 1962. “The road that we have followed on
your advice, or those of your advisors, leads nowhere.”87 Another
article attacks the US more fervently; “Point Four and other aids have
not been able to turn the immense tide of this propaganda and to show
the real motives of the United States government and the American
people.”88 In 1960 the enraged former mayor of Tehran, Arsalan
Khalatbari, made his voice heard on the floor of the Majlis. “You have
imposed upon us four to five hundred advisors at our expense. You
have raised the costs of living in our country. Whatever you gave us
in aid we paid your advisors in salaries. Whatever we imported with
your aid dollars hurt our own exports.”89 Members of Iran’s intellectual
elite, although oppressed, were more outspoken about aid corruption
and contradiction than American aid officials.
While the US seemingly helped to modernize Iran in the fields of
education, agriculture, and public administration, it was not enough
to appease critics who paid attention to other American actions in
Iran. In addition to the CIA covert coup of democratically elected
Prime Minister Mossadegh in 1953, with the Shah’s coaxing of Majlis
members the Status of Forces Agreement was passed in Iran in 1964.
The Agreement ensured American military personnel immunity from
Iranian laws. This was controversial in Iran and was cause for many
protests and growing animosity towards the US, as well as raised
questions about the Shah’s loyalty. Some accused the Shah of imposing
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modernization too swiftly and disrespecting religious and cultural
traditions along the way.
In 1976, the Peace Corps withdrew from Iran. The reason for the
Peace Corps’ exit from Iran was apparently due to the goals of the
program had been achieved.90 According to the 1976 national census,
literacy levels had improved; 58.9% of males and 35.5% of females
above six years old were literate.91 As the focus of the Peace Corps in
Iran was raising literacy and most volunteers were assigned to teach,
surely the Peace Corps contributed to the raise in rates.
What the reports do not mention, however, is that Iran was supposedly
deemed no longer eligible for the Peace Corps. Interestingly, precise
stipulations for a country’s eligibility to host the Peace Corps never had
existed; it had always been at the discretion of Peace Corps officials
with Congressional approval, fluid and subject to change. So if Peace
Corps officials or Congress decided to pull the program from Iran,
why in the mid-1970s? Given Iran’s heightened oil revenues in the mid1970s, if leaders wanted the Peace Corps to continue they would have
to shoulder the cost. But while government officials welcomed and
appreciated the Peace Corps in Iran, they were not prepared to pay
for it out of pocket. Perhaps the Shah’s suspicions of the Peace Corps
contributed to the exit in 1976.
By 1976, 6.6 million barrels of oil were extracted daily and annual oil
revenues reached nearly $25 billion.92 Along with Iran’s oil revenues,
its military too had grown tremendously. By 1976, Iran’s military
expenditures were the seventh largest in the world.93 Thanks to the
United States, Iran had seemingly moved up the world’s food chain. In
1977 Iran was ranked as the largest foreign buyer of American made
arms; $5.7 billion worth of arms purchased in that year alone. Between
1973 and 1978, Iran acquired over $19 billion worth of arms from the
US.94
Other sources dispute the reason for which the Peace Corps left.
According to Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman’s book, All You Need Is Love:
the Peace Corps and the Spirit of the 1960s, the Peace Corps did not leave
Iran under questions of funding; Iran asked them to leave. Of the
sixteen countries that ever asked the Peace Corps to leave, eleven asked
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the Peace Corps to return. 95 The Peace Corps has never made the
choice to leave a country unless volunteers were in serious jeopardy.
With the exit of Peace Corps Volunteers, public diplomacy programs
to Iran were terminated.
The Failed Americanization of Iran and the Islamic Revolution
By some measures the aid work done in Iran between 1951 and
1976 proved successful. The American aid extension to Iran was an
American investment in a valuable geopolitical region of the world,
commencing at the crucial moment when communism was a looming
possibility. The Shah ruled Iran in accordance with American interests,
making Iran an American surrogate in the Persian Gulf. Over the course
of the 25-year public diplomacy period, the United States and Iran
became exceedingly close and interdependent, during which time CIA
coercion and benevolent aid programs came as an American export
package. By leaving in 1976, Washington must have been confident
they built a strong ally of Iran while preserving oil interests.
Iranians discontent shattered all illusions of U.S.-Iranian closeness
when revolution broke out in 1978, as anti-Shah sentiment exploded.
Rioters overran the streets, but this time they had not been paid to do
so by the CIA as was the case in 1953. Despite money and military, the
Shah fled Iran for Rome in 1979. It was then that Ayatollah Ruhallah
Khomeini emerged from the shadows of exile, and returned to Iran.
The Shah’s monarchy was not a sustainable form of government.
Arguably, the Shah’s unchecked power, matched with American
political and financial support, doomed the regime for failure from
the beginning. Festering Iranian discontent with the Shah’s abuses of
power may have made revolution inevitable, but perhaps we can credit
the revolution’s extremist direction to a reaction against the Shah’s
attempt at building a façade of rapid American-prescribed social
modernization.
The physical American presence in Iran was noteworthy; between
1944 and 1979 nearly 1 million Americans visited or lived in Iran.
In 1977 alone, approximately 50,000 Americans resided in Iran.96
Besides Foreign Service officers, diplomats, military personnel,
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and businessmen, American NGO workers, missionaries, tourists,
academics, Peace Corps volunteers, and aid workers were present,
filtering in and out of in Iran during the Cold War.
Iran was the first country to receive Point Four funds, the first to
experience a CIA orchestrated coup of a democratically-elected leader,
the first to teach the United States an important lesson in the corruption
of aid funding, and the first to storm the American Embassy, take
American hostages and chant “Down with the USA” through the
streets.97 In 1953 the United States had betrayed the Iranian people by
staging a coup that eliminated the chance of democratic representation,
and in 1979 Iranians returned the favor. What lessons can we draw
from the failed Americanization of Iran? Perhaps it is a simple one;
that corruption and contradiction-infused American foreign policies
may solve short-term problems, but will prove detrimental in the long
run, and that aid can buy neither friendship nor stability on the popular
front.
--Personal interviews with returned Peace Corps Volunteer from Iran:
Dr. Thomas Ricks, former adjunct professor of Middle East studies
at the University of Pennsylvania and the first non-Iranian to meet
with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini after the Islamic Revolution, April
2010.
Doug Schermer, February 2011.
Michael Dereskewicz, March 2011.
Jennifer Seaver, March 2011.
Donna Shalala, former Secretary of Health and Human Services
under President Clinton and current President of the University of
Miami, June 2011.
Dr. John Limbert, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Iran in the State Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and
current professor of international affairs at the United States Naval
Academy, November 2011.
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